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Equity and Debt Issuance by Firms Violating GAAP

Abstract
We examine security issuance in restated periods by firms that misreport financial
statements and find that only a small percent of such firms issues securities in the restated
period. Investors are misled by mistakes made by firms issuing equity more so than other
restating firms at the initial announcement of misreported earnings, but are not misled by
mistakes made by debt-issuing firms. Equity-issuing firms that manage earnings to beat
analyst expectations experience abnormally high returns in the restated period prior to
security issuance. Firms that restated more reports and have higher pre-mistake returns
are more likely to issue equity. High leverage, firm size and number of restated periods
are positively associated with the likelihood of debt issuance by restating firms.
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1. Introduction
We study equity and debt issuance in restated periods by firms that violate
Generally Accepted Accounting Principals (GAAP). 1 Prior literature suggests that one of
the reasons firms violate GAAP is to reduce the cost of security issuance (Dechow,
Sloan, and Sweeny (1996), Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2003), Burns and Kedia (2006),
Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006)). These studies find that firms that restate
financial statements or are subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
enforcement actions for financial reporting violations (AAERs) raise more capital than
control firms during violation periods. They also find that security issuance in the
violation period increases the likelihood of a restatement or an AAER. They interpret
these results as evidence that firms manage earnings to issue securities at better prices.
However, these results are weak evidence to suggest that restating firms violate
GAAP in order to issue securities at inflated prices. For example, it is plausible that when
equity and debt issuance is motivated by other considerations, it results in higher scrutiny
of the firm’s accounting by managers, auditors, the SEC and other market participants
and thus increases the likelihood of a restatement or an AAER. Another explanation for
high security issuance in the restated period is the successful market timing by
management. Above mentioned studies also find that firms restating financial statements
experience abnormally high performance prior to the first restated year. Therefore,
abnormally high firm performance prior to misreporting can be driving both security
issuance and the likelihood of misreporting. In fact, Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson
(2006) find that security issuance does not explain the likelihood of a restatement when
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Restated period is defined as the period between the beginning of the first restated year or quarter and the
date of restatement announcement.
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the pre-misstatement price run up is included as an explanatory variable. This result is
consistent with Jensen’s (2005) theory of overvalued equity which suggests that
overpricing leads to value destructive behavior, such as earnings management.
Furthermore, none of these papers test whether erroneous accounting prior to security
issuance is associated with misvaluation in the restated period.
The main contribution of this paper is that it goes beyond the analysis of the
frequency of security issuance in the restated period and tests whether restating firms
experience abnormally high performance in the period after GAAP violation but before
security issuance, and whether this performance is related to the magnitude of accounting
misrepresentation relative to expectations. This paper is also the first to examine which
restating firms are more likely to issue equity and debt.
We analyze 446 US firms that restated financial statements due to violations of
GAAP during the period from January 1, 1996 to June 30, 2002. A sample of restating
firms provides a unique setting for studying the impact of the quality of financial
information on security issuance because ex post one observes the date and the nature of
mistakes in financial statements and the date of the correction of those mistakes. We read
restatement announcements to determine which financial reports were restated and the
impact of restatement on net income. Our research design allows us to directly test
whether overstatement of reported earnings is associated with investors over optimism
about firm prospects prior to equity and debt issuance. Unlike prior studies that examined
security issuance by restating firms (Burns and Kedia (2006), Efendi, Srivastava and
Swanson (2006)), we focus on actual security issuance rather than balance sheet proxies.
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We find that only a small percent of restating firms issues securities in the restated
period: 15% of restating firms issue equity and 6% issue debt in the restated period,
compared with 9% of control firms issuing equity and 4% issuing debt. 2 The difference
between the frequencies of security issuance is statistically significant. Although the
percent of restating firms issuing securities is higher than the percent of control firms
issuing securities, the number of issuances in the restated period is small to argue that
security issuance is the dominant reason for violating GAAP - only 20% of firms issue
either equity or debt. Therefore, 80% of restating firms were not motivated by security
issuance to violate GAAP. Moreover, not all restating firms that issue equity manage
earnings upward. Nineteen percent of equity issuing firms and twenty one percent of debt
issuing firms understate net income prior to the issuance. If the firm understates net
income prior to security issuance, it will not obtain financing at more favorable terms.
Therefore, security issuance could not be a rational motivation for downward earnings
management. Overall, the results suggest that there is no strong connection between the
act of restatement and security issuance.
If some firms violate GAAP to reduce financing costs, then we should observe
positive association between abnormal return at the announcement of earnings and the
mistake, adjusted for expected earnings. We test this proposition by examining whether
investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings prior to equity and debt issuance.
Following Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011) we decompose reported earnings into
correctly stated component and mistake and examine abnormal returns at the initial

2

Control firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1,
1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market
value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have
sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement.
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earnings as a function of these numbers relative to expectations. Expectations are
measured as consensus analyst forecasts. We find that investors attach the same valuation
coefficient to the erroneous component of earnings as they do to the true earnings.
Investors are more misled by mistakes made by equity issuing firms prior to the issuance,
but are not misled by mistakes prior to debt issuance. For equity-issuing firms that
manage earnings to beat analyst expectations abnormal returns persist beyond
announcement window – such firms experience abnormally high returns in the restated
period prior to security issuance. Interestingly, for equity issuing firms there is little
evidence of abnormal performance before the mistakes are made, which suggests that the
abnormal performance prior to equity issuance is caused by earnings management.
Overall our results suggest that a small number of firms that violate GAAP and
subsequently issue equity mislead investors.
We also examine which types of firms in the cross-section are most likely to use
earnings management to issue equity and debt. We find that restating firms that issue
equity are larger in market value terms than non-issuing firms, have higher pre-mistake
return, make smaller downward revisions of net income and restate more reports.
Restating firms that issue debt are considerably larger, more highly levered, and make
smaller downward revisions of net income than non-issuing firms and firms issuing
equity. Restating firms that issue debt restate more reports than non-issuing firms, but not
firms issuing equity.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is the first paper to
examine whether firm performance is abnormal subsequent to GAAP violations before
equity and debt issuances and whether such performance is associated with the magnitude
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of the restatement. Prior literature assumed that if the firm issues securities in the restated
period, the issuance follows the period of abnormal performance induced by earnings
management (Burns and Kedia (2006), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006), Dechow,
Sloan and Sweeney (1996)). This paper provides a direct test of this claim. Because the
adverse impact of restatements on shareholder wealth at restatement announcement has
been used to motivate a number of regulations, including some provisions in the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 2002 (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004)), Agrawal and Chadha
(2005)), it is important to understand the full impact of restatements on financial markets.
Second, this is the first paper to document the frequency of equity and debt issuance in
the restated period and examine characteristics of restating firms issuing securities. The
results of this paper complement the growing stream of literature studying the causes and
consequences of financial misreporting, and show that contrary to prior beliefs, security
issuance at inflated prices by restating firms is not prevalent.
Moreover, this paper provides a test of the earnings management hypothesis
posed by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) for firms violating GAAP. The earnings
management hypothesis suggests that firms pursue aggressive accounting practices prior
to equity issuance. Such practices mislead investors and cause them to overvalue security
issuance. However, as the true value of earnings is revealed, investors devalue firms that
manage earnings. To test the earnings management hypothesis, Teoh, Welch and Wong
(1998b) used abnormal accruals prior to equity issuance as a proxy for earnings
management. 3 However, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), Shivakumar (2000), and
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A finding that is common to studies that examine earnings management prior to seasoned equity offerings
(SEOs), convertible debt issuance, initial public offerings (IPOs) or stock-financed acquisitions is that firms
that engage in such activities on average contain positive abnormal accrual components prior to the event,
that the accruals are negatively related to post-event stock returns, and that accruals tend to reverse during
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Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) among others show that abnormal accruals is a poor
measure of earnings management prior to security issuance.4 The advantage of testing the
earnings management hypothesis using a sample of restatements is that ex post one
observes the details of accounting misreporting. However, accrual management is a more
common practice, which does not impose the large costs of financial misrepresentation
that are associated with restatements. Therefore, while this study extends the prior
literature that tested the earnings management hypothesis using accruals, its results are
not directly comparable to that stream of literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and
outlines hypotheses tested in this paper. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents
results and Section 5 concludes.

2. Related literature and hypotheses
A firm is required to file a prior period adjustment of financial statements
whenever it discovers material discrepancies in previously filed financial statements.
Restatements result in significant negative market reaction (Akhigbe, Kudla and Madura
(2005) and Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004)) that is spilled over to firms in the
same industry (Akhigbe and Madura (2008)). Markets anticipate financial statement
the post-event period (Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, b) and Rangan (1998), Friedlan (1994), DuCharme,
Malatesta, and Sefcik (2001)), Erickson and Wang (1998), Christie and Zimmerman (1994), and Urcan and
Kieschnick (2006)).
4
Shivakumar (2000) points out four problems with using discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings
management around large events such as SEOs, IPOs, and mergers. First, such events are frequently
associated with unusually large changes to working capital, independent of any earnings management.
Second, many studies estimate accruals from balance sheet changes in working capital, not by taking them
from cash flow statements. Third, accrual models commonly used to estimate earnings management are
mis-specified. Fourth, such events frequently involve substantial expenses that might be unpaid prior to the
event and hence are accrued at the balance date, resembling income increasing discretionary accruals.
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restatements as early as half way through the restated period (Bardos, Golec, Harding
(2011)). Restatements lead to an increase in a firm’s cost of capital (Hribar and Jenkins
(2004), Bardos, Cline and Koutmos (2011), and Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008), Bardos
(2011)), and increase the likelihood of litigations (Palmrose and Scholz (2004), Bradley,
Cline and Lian (2010)).
Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2003) find that 452 firms restating during the 19882000 period attracted more external capital than non-restating firms in the period of
alleged manipulation. They compare the standardized sum of additional cash raised from
common and preferred stock and long-term debt for restating versus non-restating firms
matched by industry and size during the period of alleged manipulation. Burns and Kedia
(2007) analyze a sample of 215 firms restating over a period from 1995 through 2002.
They find some evidence that restating firms raise more funds in misreported years than
non-restating S&P 1,500 firms in univariate, but not in multivariate settings. Efendi,
Srivastava and Swanson (2006) find that firms making restatements in 2001 and 2002
raise more funds in the first misstated year than control firms matched on size and bookto-market. 5 The paper does not examine security issuance beyond the first misstated year.
These studies interpreted the result that restating firms issue more external funds
than control samples as evidence in favor of the earnings management hypothesis, i.e.,
firms manage earnings to issue securities at more favorable prices. There are several
problems with such inference. First, there are other potential explanations for the
5

In a related paper, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) studied 92 firms that were subject to SEC
enforcement actions for financial reporting violations (AAERs) between 1978 and 1990. They report that
the main motivation as cited by the SEC for earnings management was to issue securities at inflated prices.
They also find that the AAER sample raises more external funds than control sample. The paper did not
investigate whether or not funds were issued at a lower cost than they would have been in the absence of
earnings management.
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observed result. It has been shown by the same studies that misstatements follow periods
of stock price run-up. Therefore, a higher number of issuances by restating firms in a
restated period can simply be the result of a manager’s ability to time the market. Indeed
many studies find that firms issue equity when their shares are overpriced (Jung, Kim and
Stulz (1996), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), (Dittmar and Thakor (2007),
Asquith and Mullins (1986), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Burch, Christie, and Nanda
(2004)). Another plausible explanation for this result is that firms that issue securities are
more likely to restate as they face greater scrutiny by the SEC, auditors and investors than
non-issuing firms. Third, these papers did not test whether erroneous reporting that leads
to restatements inflates security prices prior to security issuance and therefore allows
management to issue securities at more favorable prices.
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing whether material mistakes in
financial statements allow restating firms to reduce financing costs. We study a sample of
firms that restated financial statements during 1997-2002. For these firms we can ex post
identify financial reports which contained mistakes as well as the size of the mistakes
(see Figure 1). We can also determine if the firms issued securities in the restated period.

Equity or Debt
issuance date
Beginning of the 1st
restated period

Restatement
Announcement date
Time

Mistake

-b
Pre-mistake period

Issuance
Restated period

Restatement
+a
Post-restatement period

Figure 1: Mistake is the beginning of the first restated period, Issuance is the date of equity or debt
issuance, Restatement is the date of the restatement announcement, -b and +a are time periods of interest.
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If security issuance at favorable prices is one of the main motivations for
misreporting earnings as suggested by prior studies, then one should observe a higher
frequency of security issuance by restating firms relative to control firms in the restated
period. This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1: Restating firms issue more equity and debt than control firms.
We examine the number of equity and debt issuances in the restated period
relative to a sample of control firms. Unlike prior studies that use the sum of funds raised
through equity and debt obtained from Compustat, we use security issuance data from
Securities Data Corporation, which allows us to determine the precise timing of the
issuance.
As noted earlier, even if hypothesis 1 is supported, this would not imply that
material mistakes in financial statements reduced financing costs of restating firms. The
likelihood of security issuance and the likelihood of restatement can be driven by the
same variable, such as overvaluation in the pre-mistake period. Security issuance in the
restated period can increase the likelihood of restatement due to additional scrutiny of
financial statements by management, auditors, regulators and other market participants.
To test whether misreporting allows restating firms to issue securities at more
favorable prices, we examine whether material mistakes of issuing firms result in
misvaluation. If investors are misled by material mistakes in reported earnings then they
would price the error component of earnings the same way as they price the true earnings.
For example, if the error puts the firm in line with expectations, then there should be no
abnormal performance at the announcement of earnings. Similarly, if overstated earnings
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cause the firm to beat expectations that may generate positive abnormal performance.
Most of the action will take place at the announcement of earnings.
A well established result in the literature is that earnings announcement returns
are positively related to unexpected earnings (Ball and Brown (1968), Collins and
Kothari (1989)). Abnormal return Rt at the earnings announcement at time t is a function
of the difference between reported earnings I t and expected earnings Et-1(I t ) . The
difference between reported and expected earnings I t − Et-1(I t ) has been termed
standardized earnings surprise SUE:

R t = α + b1(I t − E t-1(I t )) + ε t = α + b1SUE t + ε t ,

(1)

The coefficient b1 is called the earnings response coefficient (ERC).
Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011) study whether investors are misled by
misstated earnings by estimating whether investors attach the same earnings response
coefficient to the misstated earnings as they do to the true component of earnings.
Specifically, they estimate the following equation:
Rt = α + b1(I t − Et-1(I t )) + b2 M t + ε t = α + b1SUE t + b2 MISTAKE t + ε t ,

(2)

where Mt (MISTAKE) is the amount by which earnings are misstated, Rt is market
adjusted return for a 3 day window (-1; +1) relative to the earnings announcement on day
zero. They find that coefficient b2 is positive and equal to b1 , suggesting that investors
are fooled by mistakes in financial statements and treat misstated component of earnings
the same way that they treat the correctly stated component.
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If firms violate GAAP to reduce financing costs, then we should observe positive
association between abnormal return at the announcement of earnings and the mistake,
adjusted for expected earnings.
H2: There is a positive association between abnormal earnings announcement
returns and mistake in reported earnings for firms issuing equity and debt.
To test hypothesis 2, we estimate the following two models:
Rt = α + b1SUE t + b2 MISTAKE t
+b3 Equity t + b4 Equity t * SUE t + b5 Equity t * MISTAKE t + ε t
Rt = α + b1SUE t + b2 MISTAKE t
+b3 Debt t + b4 Debt t * SUE t + b5 Debt t * MISTAKE t + ε t

,

,

(3)

(4)

Equity (Debt) is a dummy that equals one for quarters in the restated period
preceding equity (debt) issuance. For example, if a firm restated financial statements for
1999 and 2000 fiscal years and issued equity in November of 1999, then Equity will
equal one for the first three quarters of 1999 (provided that the 3rd quarter is announced
prior to equity issuance announcement).
If investors are misled by mistakes in financial reports of equity and debt issuing
firms, then b2 + b5 > 0 and b2 + b5 = b1 + b4 . If investors are only partly fooled,
then b2 + b5 < b1 + b4 . We estimate equations (3) and (4) using OLS regression. For each
firm, we include all quarters in the restated period – in this period MISTAKE is non zero.
To provide a benchmark for the estimation in the restated period, for each firm we
include quarters for two years preceding the restated period and cluster errors by firm. As
a result, usual performance of the firm in pre-restatement period is used as its own
control. Clustering standard errors by firm also corrects for cross-sectional and timeseries dependence (Petersen (2009)).
12

If the issuing firms manage earnings to beat expectations (MISTAKE>SUE) and
if investors are fooled by the mistakes (hypothesis 2 holds) the misvaluation might persist
over the longer time period. Firms that beat expectations by a greater amount should
experience greater misvaluation. Issuing firms, whose earnings management merely puts
them in line with expectations, will simply experience normal performance over an
extended period.
H3: If SUE<0 and MISTAKE>SUE, issuing firms will experience abnormal
performance in the restated period before security issuance.
To test hypothesis 3 we examine abnormal returns in the restated period until
security issuance (period (Mistake, Issuance)) relative to several benchmarks: usual
performance of the firm itself, control firm and the market. 6
Lastly, we examine which types of firms in the cross-section are most likely to
use earnings management to issue equity and debt. We also study whether there is a
difference in earnings management between debt versus equity issuance. As discussed in
the introduction and the result section, only a small percent of restating firms issue equity
and debt. Because of the small sample size, we focus only on a few key characteristics to
preserve the degrees of freedom in multivariate analysis.
An established result in the literature is that firms issue equity after periods of
run-up in stock prices (Baker and Wurgler (2002)). Prior literature has also shown that
restating firms make mistakes in financial statements following periods of abnormally
high performance (Burns and Kedia (2007), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2006)).
Therefore, we should expect firms with better pre-mistake performance to be more likely
to issue equity than debt.
6

Calculation of abnormal returns is discussed in detail in section 4.4.
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H4: Firms with better pre-mistake performance are more likely to issue equity.
Several studies find that firms close to violating lending covenants manage
earnings (Sweeney (1994), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994)), and Dechow et al. (1996)).
These studies suggest that avoidance of penalties associated with the violations of debt
covenants is a motivation to manage earnings. A firm would manage earnings to issue
new debt if earnings management allows the firm to obtain debt at more favorable terms.
A firm that meets restrictive covenants can obtain more favorable financing. Prior studies
use leverage as a proxy for the pressure firms feel to manage earnings (Richardson et al
(2002), Burns and Kedia (2007)).
H5: Firms with higher leverage are more likely to issue debt.
We examine whether firms that issue equity and debt differ from non issuing
firms in terms of restatement characteristics. If issuing firms make larger mistakes, this
would suggest that they have a longer distance to their earnings threshold. Issuing firms
are more likely to have longer restated period because the likelihood of any event is
greater during a longer time period. We also control for firm size in multivariate analysis.

3. Data
We collected a sample of US firms that announced restatements of financial
statements between January 1997 and June 2002. We searched Lexis-Nexis database
using key words “restatement”, “restat”, “revis”, “adjust”, “error” and “responding to
guidance from the SEC”. We crossed checked search results with the sample released by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Unlike the GAO sample, we excluded
restatements that were caused by an adoption of new accounting rules, and retained only
restatements due to a mistake or an improper interpretation of GAAP rules. After
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identifying the sample of companies announcing restatements, we searched for the
originally filed and restated financial statements on Lexis-Nexis (Forms 10-K/A(s) and
Forms 10-Q/A(s)). The following data was collected from restatement announcements
and original and restated financial statements: date of the announcement of restatement,
years and quarters restated, original and restated net income.
The search resulted in 536 restatements made by 496 firms. We imposed several
other filters. Some firms restated more than once during the sample period. In several
cases restated periods of multiple restatements by the same firm overlapped. To avoid
double counting security issuance, we deleted 29 restatements that had overlapping
restated periods. The later of the two restatements with overlapping restated periods was
deleted. Second, we deleted 20 restatements for which the impact on net income was zero
or could not be identified. Third, we deleted 6 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).
Because REITs are required to pay out 90% of their reported net income in dividends,
they may have different considerations when deciding whether to issue equity or debt.
Fourth, 35 observations were lost because these firms did not have data in Compustat to
find a matching firm. The final sample consists of 446 restatements by 436 firms. Ten
firms restated financial statements twice during the restated period (Table 1, Panel A).
Return data is from CRSP. Financial data was obtained from Compustat. Information on
equity and debt issuance is taken from the Securities Data Corporation database (SDC
Platinum).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
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4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1, Panel B shows the distribution of restatements by year, which is similar
to that of prior studies. There was an increase in restatements in 1999 and 2000. Note that
2002 restatements were collected only through July. As a result, all restatements in the
sample precede the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and are made in a common
regulatory environment.

Table 1, Panel C shows distribution of restatement

characteristics. An average firm restates 1.34 annual reports. Table 1, Panel C also shows
the distribution of the magnitude of the mistake, which is measured as the difference
between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by the
absolute value of the originally reported net income (ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI)). This measure
is heavily skewed, with the mean falling below the first quartile. The median reduction of
previously reported net income is -23% for the full sample. Table 1, Panel C also shows
the distribution of the ΔNI/Assets, which is the difference between restated net income
and originally reported net income, standardized by book value of total assets measured
one year prior to restatement announcement. This measure of mistake shows similar
pattern as does ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI). However, ΔNI/Assets is considerably less skewed.
Therefore, we rely more on the tests using ΔNI/Assets. Table 1, Panel D shows that the
majority of restating firms revise net income downward at restatement announcement
(downward restatements). Only 13.7% of our sample revises net income upward at
restatement announcement (upward restatements). Panel E shows that downward
restatements are of greater magnitude than upward restatements.
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Table 2, Panel A shows selected characteristics of restating firms one fiscal year
prior to the announcement of restatement. The mean (median) market value of restating
firms is $2,259 million ($183 million). The mean (median) book value of restating firms
is $2,375 million ($223 million). The mean leverage is 18.45% and the mean book-tomarket ratio is 0.63.
Table 2, Panel B shows the characteristics of control firms in the year in which
the matching is performed (one year prior to the restatement announcement). Control
firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period
January 1, 1996 to June 30, 2002 in the same two digit SIC code as restating firm, that
are the closest in size and book-to-market and have sufficient data to calculate returns one
year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Market value and book-tomarket ratios of restating firms are measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of
restatement.
Table 2, Panel C compares characteristics of restating and control firms using 2tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test. The samples do not differ in terms of size and book-tomarket, which indicates a successful match. They also do not differ in terms of the book
value of assets. Restating firms are more highly levered than control firms. On average,
restating firms have a capital structure that has 2% more debt.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
4.2. Equity and debt issuance
Results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 show that restating firms issue more
equity and debt in the restated period than non-restating firms. Table 3, Panel A shows
frequency of equity issuance by restating and control firms in the restated period.
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Restated period is defined as the period between the beginning of the period of the first
mistake (year or quarter) and the restatement announcement. There are 85 equity
issuances made by 68 restating firms. The number of equity issuances by restating firms
is surprisingly low. Only fifteen percent of restatements have equity issuance in restated
period. Control firms issue less equity. Forty one control firms issue equity in 48 matched
restated periods. This supports hypothesis 1 and suggests that equity issuance serves as a
motivation for some restating firms.
The majority of restating and control firms issue equity only once (78% of
restating firms and 85% of the control firms). Thirteen of restating firms and five of
control firms issue equity twice, two of restating firms issue equity three times and one of
control firms issues equity four times (Table 3, Panel B). Restating firms raise more
equity per issuance: $110 million versus $82 million per control firm, however the
difference is not statistically significant. Both restating and control firms raise non-trivial
amounts of equity as a percent of total assets: 33.74% and 40.67% for restating firms and
control firms, respectively.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 4 shows the same statistics for debt issuance in the restated period. 7 We
find that while fewer restating firms issue debt than equity in the restated period (6.28%),
many firms raise debt more than once in restated period and raise more funds per
issuance. Similar pattern is seen for control firms. There are more debt issuances in
restated period by restating firms than control firms. However, the difference in the
7

Number of debt issuances figures in Table 4 combine straight and convertible debt issuance. Statistics for
the two types of issuances are combined because of very small number of convertible debt issuances. There
are four convertible debt issuances by restating firms and three by control firms. Small number of
observations does not allow further statistics analysis of convertible debt issuance. All results are
unaffected by exclusion of convertible debt issuances.
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number of firms raising debt between restating and control sub-samples is not statistically
significant (28 restating firms versus 18 control firms). Therefore, hypothesis 1 is not
supported for debt issuance. Moreover, control firms raise more per issuance: the mean
issuance size is $167.96 million (1.91% of total assets) for restating firms and $216.56
million (2.88% of total assets) for control firms. This difference is statistically significant.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Interestingly, not all restating firms that issue equity manage earnings upward.
We find that 13 out of 68 restating firms that issued equity in the restated period
understated net income; and 6 out of 28 debt issuing firms understated net income. We
call firms that understated net income and as a result had to revise net income upward as
upward restatements. If the firm understates net income prior to security issuance, it will
not obtain financing at more favorable terms. Therefore, security issuance could not be a
rational reason for downward earnings management. We focus our analysis on 55 equity
issuing and 22 debt issuing firms that restate net income downward (downward
restatements).

4.3. Market reaction to initial announcement of misstated earnings
In this section we test hypothesis 2 by analyzing market reaction to the initial
announcement of misstated earnings. We calculate SUE as standardized earnings surprise
based on Street earnings reported in I/B/E/S because Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) find
that Street earnings are more directly comparable with analysts’ forecasts. As a result,
earnings surprise is more precisely measured using Street earnings. We follow Bardos,
Golec and Harding (2011) in calculating correctly stated earnings. SUE is the difference
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between correctly stated earnings and consensus analyst forecasts. The consensus analyst
forecast is calculated as the median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to
the earnings announcement, considering only the most recent forecast for each analyst.
SUE and Mistake are standardized by the stock price. Earnings announcement dates are
obtained from I/B/E/S. We are able to identify sufficient data for estimating equations
(1)-(4) for 1,843 quarters corresponding to 226 firms. Of these firms, only 22 issued
equity and 13 issued debt in the restated period. Rt is calculated as market adjusted
return using equally weighted CRSP market index as a proxy for the market return. 8
Table 5, Panels A and D show descriptive statistics for Rt , SUE and Mistake for
various sub-samples. For the full sample, both the mean and the median Rt is positive
and equals .12% and .45%, respectively. SUE is negative, with the mean of -0.0042 and
Mistake is positive with the mean of 0.0026. We show separate table for the restated
period sample, during which Mistake is not equal zero. Interestingly, for this sub-sample
both mean and median Rt is negative and equals -1.02% and -.13%, respectively. The
median Mistake almost exactly offsets the negative median SUE, suggesting that firms
manage earnings to simply meet (rather than beat) expectations. Panels C and D show
descriptive statistics for equity issuing and debt issuing firms for the restated period
quarters. Both Mistake and SUE are larger for equity sub-sample. For debt issuing firms
mean and median mistake does not put the firms in line with expectation since SUE is
negative and in absolute terms larger than Mistake.
[Insert Table 5 about here]

8

Results are robust to using equally weighted index.
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Table 5 Panel E shows regression results for the full sample. Model 1 estimates
equation (1) and is consistent with prior literature. It finds that abnormal returns at
earnings announcement are a positive function of earnings surprise. Model (2) estimates
equation (2) and confirms results in Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011) that investors
attach positive valuation to the erroneous component of earnings and value them the
same way as correctly stated earnings (as suggested by positive b2 which equals b1).
We test hypothesis 2 by estimating Models 3 and 4 (Table 5, Panel E). Model 3
estimates equation (3), which shifts all coefficients for equity issuing firms. We find that
the dummy coefficient Equity is negative and significant, suggesting that overall Rt is
lower than for the rest of the sample. This result is consistent with univariate statistics Rt is lower in Panel C than in Panels A and B. For equity issuing firms, the total
coefficient on SUE (b1 + b4 ) and Mistake (b2 + b5 ) are positive and significant. As for the
full sample, these two coefficients are equal each other for equity issuing firms.
Significance of the coefficient on Mistake for equity issuing firms indicates that investors
are misled by mistakes of such firms. Interestingly, we find that coefficient b4 on the
interaction of SUE and Equity dummy is positive and significant. This shows that
investors react more strongly to surprises in correctly stated component of earnings of
equity issuing firms. This result suggests that equity issuing firms are overvalued.
Similarly, we find that the coefficient b5 on the interaction of Mistake and Equity dummy
is positive and significant, suggesting that investors are more misled by mistakes made by
equity issuing firms then other restating firms.
Model 4 shows similar analysis for debt issuing firms. We find that investors are
not misled by mistakes made by debt issuing firms ( (b2 + b5 ) is not significant). We also
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find that the coefficient on SUE for debt issuing firms is not significant, suggesting that
our sample might be too small to test predictions for debt issuing firms. Table 5 Panel F
shows regression results for the downward restatements. All results are similar to those
for the full sample (Panel E).
Overall, we find support for hypothesis 2 for equity but not for debt issuing firms.

4.4. Abnormal returns in the restated period before equity and debt issuance
To test hypothesis 3 we examine abnormal returns in the restated period until
security issuance (period (Mistake, Issuance)). This period begins after the restated
earnings have been reported to the market (day +2) and end two days prior to the
announcement of the security offer. For firms that are missing earnings announcement
date, the start date is calculated as the end of the quarter plus 29 days, which is the
average lag between the end of the quarter and the reporting date for our sample.
To ensure robustness of the results, we calculate several measures of abnormal
performance. First, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns prior to equity and debt
issuance in restated period ( CAR(Mistake, Issuance) ). To calculate market model CAR, we first
estimate market model parameters as follows.
Rit = α i + β i Rmt + ε it

(5)

where Rit is the return on firm i on day t, Rmt is the return on the market index on day t
(value-weighted CRSP market index), and ε it is a random error term. The abnormal
stock return for security i on day t is defined as
^

^

Market Model ARit = Rit − (α i + β i Rmt )

(6)
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Cumulative abnormal return is the sum of abnormal returns over period τ. We
report daily CARs, since some of the periods of interest are firm specific. Daily CARs are
calculated as CARs divided by the number of days over which accumulation occurred.
We estimate market model parameters for 250 trading days starting on day -250
relative to the beginning of the restated period. This window is chosen so that the same
market model parameter estimates can be used to test whether CARs are abnormal one
year before the beginning of restated period ( CAR(1 year, Mistake) ). Unfortunately, only 32 of
68 equity issuing firms have enough data to estimate market model parameters for this
period. To recover some of the observations and to ensure the robustness of the results,
we also estimate market model parameters for 250 days starting on day -5 relative to
mistake. Table 6 shows that the results depend on the estimation period for market model
parameters. Therefore, we estimated two more measures of abnormal performance:
market adjusted abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns.
Market adjusted abnormal return is calculated as
Market Adjusted ARit = Rit − Rmt

(7)

The advantage of using this return is that it does not require the estimation of the
market model parameters and therefore leads to fewer lost observations. The drawback is
that market adjusted return does not account for the market risk.
Buy-and-hold return ( BHRi ,τ ) over period τ

for firm i is calculated as the

geometric return. BHRi ,τ represents the actual experience of an investor who passively
holds a sample firm for period τ .
T

BHRi ,τ = ∏ (1 + Rit ) ,

(8)

t
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where Rit is the ith firm return on the tth day, and T is the number of trading days
in period τ. Buy and hold abnormal return ( BHARi ,τ ) is calculated as:

BHARi ,τ = BHRi ,τ − E ( BHRi ,τ ) ,

(9)

where E ( BHRi ,τ ) is the τ period expected return for security i. We use two

estimates of expected earnings. The first proxy is the performance of restating firm itself
one year before the start of the restated period. The second proxy is the return on a size
and book-to-market matched peer firm in the same industry (two digit SIC code) as the
restating firm. 9 We follow Lyon, Barber and Tsai’s (1999) approach to selecting among
possible control firms. They showed that control firm approach yields well specified
results when control firms are matched on size and book to market. 10 Size is measured by
the market value of equity. Book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of equity book
value to equity market value. Both size and book to market are calculated one year prior
to restatement. We eliminate all restating firms from the pool of potential control firms.
We also require control firms to have CRSP data at least one year prior to mistake and
one year subsequent to restatement.
First, we calculate returns in the period (Mistake, Issuance) for all firms issuing
equity and debt (Table 6, Panels A and B). Table 7, Panel A shows restated period
abnormal returns prior to equity issuance. We find that BHARs both relative to control
firm and relative to pre-mistake period are positive and significant and equal 0.45% and
0.31%, respectively.

11

Market adjusted CAR is also positive and significant. However,

9

Control firms for three companies had to be found within one digit SIC code to satisfy data requirements.
They also show that when using this approach regular t statistics are well specified.
11
The period between mistake and security issuance and between security issuance and restatement are
firm specific. Therefore, we present daily abnormal returns in Table 6.
10
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market model adjusted abnormal returns are not statistically different from zero for this
period. Since BHARs are considered to be better measures of abnormal performance
during longer periods, we conclude that equity issuing firms experience abnormally
positive performance after mistake before security issuance.
Next, we test hypothesis 3 by constraining the sample to only those firms for
which MISTAKE>SUE before equity issuance. We calculate total SUE and total Mistake
for the period (Mistake, Issuance) by adding SUE and Mistake for all quarters announced
in this period. Of the 22 firms issuing equity with available data for SUE, 16 (73%)
make mistakes that allow them to beat expectations (MISTAKE>SUE). For all of this
firms SUE<0, which means that in the absence of earnings management such firms would
not have met analyst expectations. Unfortunately, the data is available only for 11 of
these firms for calculation of abnormal returns. Despite small sample, we find that for
these firms all measures of abnormal returns are positive and statistically significant. 12
This supports hypothesis 3 for equity issuing firms – firms that manage earnings to beat
analyst expectations experience abnormally high returns in the restated period prior to
security issuance.
Table 6 Panel C shows abnormal returns one year before restated period for firms
issuing equity in the restated period (1 Year, Mistake). Only market adjusted CAR is
positive and significant, suggesting that most of the overvaluation starts after the firm
reports erroneous earnings.

12

Results are not tabulated for brevity.
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Table 6 Panels B and D show that for debt issuing firms all returns are statistically
insignificant from zero for the period (Mistake, Issuance) and (1 Year, Mistake). 13 We do
not report market model CARs, for which market model parameters are estimated during
period (-254,-5), because estimation period for model parameters coincides with CAR
period. Only market model CAR, with market model parameters estimated during the
period (-501, -250) relative to mistake, is estimated for this window. This result is not
surprising in light of the finding that mistakes made by debt issuing firms do not cause
misvaluation even during a three day window at the announcement of misstated earnings.

4.5. Characteristics of issuing firms
Table 7 examines characteristics of restating firms conditional on security
issuance for the full sample of restating firms. 14 Panels A and B show characteristics of
restating firms that do not issue securities in restated period and those that issue equity,
respectively. Panel C compares these sub-samples using two-tailed Wilcoxon signed
ranks test. We find that restating firms that issue equity in restated period have higher
market value and return one year before the start of the restated period. They have the
same book value, leverage and book-to-market ratio compared to firms that do not issue
securities in restated period.
We find that firms that issue equity in restated period inflate net income less
through erroneous accounting than non-issuing firms. This suggests that restating firms
has shorter distance to the benchmark they are trying to meet. Despite this, as we showed
in section 4.3, market reacts more strongly to surprises and mistakes made by restating
13

For 10 out of 12 firms issuing debt with available data for calculating SUE, SUE is negative. For 9 firms
with negative SUE Mistake is greater than SUE.
14
The results are robust to constraining the sample to downward restatements.
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firms that issue equity than by non-issuing firms. Restating firms that issue equity in
restated period have longer restated periods than firms that do not issue equity. This
result can be due to the increase in the likelihood of any event happening during longer
period of time.
Table 7, Panels D shows characteristics of firms that issue debt in restated period
and Table 7, Panel E compares this sub-sample to that of restating firms that do not issue
securities. Restating firms that issue debt are much larger, more highly levered, make
smaller mistakes and have longer restated periods than non-issuing sub-sample. As in the
case of equity issuing firms, the magnitude of the mistake is smaller for debt-issuing
firms than for non-issuing sub-sample. Unlike equity issuing firms, debt issuing firms do
not exhibit positive stock returns in pre-mistake period.
Table 7, Panel F compares restating firms that issue debt in restated period to
restating firms that issue equity in restated period. We find that firms that issue debt are
much larger and have higher leverage than restating firms that issue equity in restated
period. Firms that issue equity make larger mistakes in net income than firms that issue
debt. Since higher net income is more likely to have a greater positive impact on equity
price than on debt price, this result is consistent with managers inflating earnings to
obtain better financing.
Overall we find support for hypothesis 4: equity issuing firms have better premistake performance than non-issuing firms and debt-issuing firms. We also find support
for hypothesis 5: debt issuing firms have higher leverage than both equity-issuing and
non-issuing firms.
[Insert Table 7 about here]

27

Table 8 tests hypotheses 4 and 5 in a multivariate setting. Specifically, we
examine the likelihood of equity and debt issuance as a function of firm and restatement
characteristics by running a logit model. The dependent variable in Model 1 (Model 2),
Equity (Debt), is equal to 1 if the firm issued equity (debt) and zero otherwise. Please see
legend to Table 7 for precise definitions of other variables.
Model 1: Equity = a + β1 Buy-and-hold return before mistake + β2 Leverage
+ β3 ΔNI/Assets + β4 Number of periods restated + β5 log(Market value)
Model 2: Debt = a + β1 Buy-and-hold return before mistake + β2 Leverage
+ β3 ΔNI/Assets + β4 Number of periods restated + β5 log(Market value)
Hypothesis 4 predicts that β1>0 in Model 1 and insignificant coefficient β1 in Model 2.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that β2>0 in Model 2 and is insignificant in Model 1. We also
control for restatement characteristics: its magnitude (ΔNI/Assets) and number of periods
restated (Number of periods restated). We also control for firm size by including
logarithm of market capitalization log(Market value). We expect that larger firms are
more likely to issue equity and security.
We estimate Models 1 and 2 only for downward restatements for which firms
managed their earnings upward. As discussed earlier, downward earnings management
prior to security issuance cannot lead to more favorable financing and therefore must be
motivated by other considerations.
We find support for hypothesis 4 and 5. Firms that issue equity have higher return
before mistake than non-issuing firms (β1>0 in Model 1). Coefficient β1 is statistically
insignificant in Model 2 suggesting that debt issuing firms do not exhibit high returns
prior to the start of the restated period. We also find support for hypothesis 2: coefficient
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β2 on leverage is positive and statistically significant in Model 2 and is indifferent from
zero in Model 1. The only other significant coefficient in Model 1 is the coefficient β4 on
the Number of periods restated. This coefficient is also significant in Model 4, which is
consistent with univariate analysis. We also find that restating firms are more likely to
issue debt when they make smaller mistakes as suggested by β3>0. Debt is issued by
larger firms.
In results not tabulated we consider other firm and restatement characteristics and
add them to models 1 and 2 one at a time. To control for growth opportunities we include
book-to-market and sales growth. Firms with higher growth prospects should be more
likely to issue securities. However, we find that the coefficients on book-to-market and
sales growth are not statistically significant in either model. In alternative specification,
we control for profitability by including return on assets but find the coefficient to be
insignificantly different from zero.

5. Conclusion

Increasing number of firms restate financial statements (GAO (2002), Huron
(2005)). Large shareholder losses associated with restatements motivated several
legislations, including Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz
(2004)). It has been suggested that firms manage earnings, both within GAAP and
outside of GAAP, to issue securities at favorable prices. Such practices mislead investors
and cause them to overvalue security issuance. However, as investors learn the true value
of earnings, they revalue firms that manage earnings downwards. This conjecture was
called the earnings management hypothesis by Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b).
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This paper tests earnings management hypothesis using a sample of firms
restating financial statements during the period of January 1997- June 2002. We find that
while restating firms issue more equity and debt than control firms, the number of
issuances is small. Moreover, about 20% of equity and dent issuing firms manage net
income downward prior to security issuance, which is inconsistent with the earnings
management hypothesis. This result implies that security issuance is not the dominant
reason for violating GAAP for more than 80% of restating firms.
Restating firms that issue equity outperform the market and the control firms
subsequent to GAAP violation and prior to equity issuance and perform better one year
prior to GAAP violation. Earnings management hypothesis is not supported for firms that
issue debt in restated period. They do not exhibit any abnormal performance prior to debt
issuance in restated period and one year before mistake. In conclusion, overall results
suggest limited support for earnings management hypothesis for a sample of firms
violating GAAP.
Restating firms that issue equity are larger in market value terms than non-issuing
firms, have higher pre-mistake return, make smaller downward revisions of net income
and restate more reports. Restating firms that issue debt are considerably larger, more
highly levered, and make smaller downward revisions of net income than non-issuing
firms and firms issuing equity. Restating firms that issue debt restate more reports than
non-issuing firms, but not firms issuing equity.
Overall our results indicate that only a few restating firms that issue equity obtain
financing at better terms.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of restating firms
This table shows descriptive statistics for a sample of publicly traded U.S. companies that announced financial
statement restatements during the period January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002. Restatement announcement dates
were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases using key words “restatement” “restat” “revis”
“adjust” “error” and “responding to guidance from the SEC” during the period January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002.
Further details about restatement were found in original and restated financial statements. Resulting sample was
cross-checked with the sample released by Government Accountability Office. Unlike the GAO sample. We
excluded restatements that were caused by an adoption of new accounting rules, and retained only restatements
due to a mistake or an improper interpretation of GAAP rules. ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) is the difference between
restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by the absolute value of the originally
reported net income. ΔNI/Assets is the difference between restated net income and originally reported net
income, standardized by book value of total assets measured one year prior to restatement announcement.
Downward (upward) restatements are defined as restatements revising net income downward (upward) at
restatement announcement.

Panel A: Frequency of restatements
Number of restatements
Number of firms
1
2
Total

426
10
436

Panel B: Distribution of restating firms by announcement year
Number of
Announcement year
restatements
1997
56
1998
58
1999
104
2000
105
2001
63
2002
60
Total
446
Panel C: Restatement characteristics
Sample
Number of restated years
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI)
ΔNI/Assets

Mean
1.34
-2.426
-0.043

Median
1.00
-0.231
-0.011

Q3
2.00
-0.049
-0.002

N
446
430
436

Panel E: Distribution of ΔNI/Assets for Downward and Upward restatements
Mean
Q1
Median
Downward restatement
-0.457
-0.055
-0.015
Upward restatements
0.059
0.003
0.014

Q3
-0.004
0.069

N
375
61

Panel D: Downward and Upward restatements
Number of firms
Downward restatement
385
Upward restatements
61

Q1
0.50
-0.732
-0.385

%
86.3%
13.7%
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of restating and control firms
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for a sample of firms that restated financial statements during the
period January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002. Firm characteristics are calculated one year prior to the year
of restatement announcement. Market value is calculated as the product of the closing price at the end
of the fiscal year and the number of common shares outstanding. Book value is the book value of total
common equity. Leverage is calculated as the value of the long term debt deflated by end of year
assets. Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of total common equity to the market value. Panel B
shows descriptive statistics for the sample of control firms. Control firms are found among all firms
that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same two
digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market value) and book-to-market,
measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have sufficient data to
calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Panel C presents
Z-value and p-value (P>Z) of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (2-tailed). *, **, *** indicates
significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Characteristics of restating firms
Mean
Market value (in millions)
2,259.09
Book value (in millions)
2,375.33
Leverage
18.45%
Book-to-market ratio
0.63

Q1
44.34
55.78
1.14%
0.19

Median
182.87
223.41
13.31%
0.44

Q3
682.51
1,059.37
29.49%
0.83

N
446
446
444
446

Panel B: Characteristics of control firms
Mean
Market value (in millions)
2,276.91
Book value (in millions)
2,099.64
Leverage
16.44%
Book-to-market ratio
0.63

Q1
44.88
48.45
0.36%
0.19

Median
183.14
187.60
10.71%
0.44

Q3
688.37
813.37
26.46%
0.84

N
446
446
446
446

Panel C: Comparison of characteristics of restating and control firms
Mean
Z-value
Market value (in millions)
-17.82
-0.10
Book value (in millions)
275.69
1.44
Leverage
2.00%
1.68
Book-to-market ratio
-0.002
-0.03

P>Z
92.15%
15.01%
9.37% *
97.22%
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Table 3. EQUITY issuance in restated period
This table shows number of equity issuances in restated period and amounts raised by 436 firms restating financial statements during the period January 1, 1997 June 30, 2002 and control firms. Restated period is defined as the period between the beginning of the period of the first mistake (year or quarter) and the
restatement announcement. Control firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the
same two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of
restatement, and have sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Panel A shows Chi-square test for binary
variables to compare number of issuances for restating and control samples. Panel C presents Z-value and p-value (P>Z) of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (2tailed) for the difference in mean amounts raised. *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Panel A: EQUITY issuances in restated period
Restating firms
Control firms
Chi-square test for binary variables
P-value of chi-square test

Number of equity issuances
85
48
11.12
<0.01***

Panel B. Number of EQUITY issuances per firm
Number of equity issuances by the same firm
1
2
3
4
Total

Restating Firms
53
13
2
0
68

Panel C. Principal amount of EQUITY raised (in millions)
Sample
Total Amount
Raised
Restating Firms
$9,205.40
Control Firms
$3,876.10

33.76%
40.67%

Control Firms
35
5
0
1
41

Mean

Q1

Median

Q3

N

$109.59
$82.47

$35.15
$35.20

$59.45
$57.60

$137.55
$139.20

84
47

Q1

Median

Q3

N

9.47%
8.90%

23.12%
25.26%

42.47%
54.48%

84
47

Panel D. Principal amount of EQUITY raised (as a percent of total assets)
Sample
Mean
Restating Firms
Control Firms

Number of issuing firms
68
41
7.62
0.01***

Difference
Z-value
P>Z
0.28
0.78

Difference
Z-value
P>Z
-0.82
0.41
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Table 4. DEBT issuance in restated period
This table shows number of debt issuances in restated period and amounts raised by 436 firms restating financial
statements during the period January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002 and control firms. Restated period is defined as the
period between the beginning of the period of the first mistake (year or quarter) and the restatement
announcement. Control firms are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period
January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size
(market value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have
sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and one year subsequent to restatement. Panel A
shows Chi-square test for binary variables to compare number of issuances for restating and control samples.
Panel C presents Z-value and p-value (P>Z) of the Wilcoxon signed ranks test (2-tailed) for the difference in mean
amount raised. *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Panel A: DEBT Issuances in restated period

Restating firms
Control firms
Chi-square test for binary variables
P-value of chi-square test

Number
of debt
issuances
128
72
13.4063
<0.01***

Number of issuing
firms
28
18
2.2921
0.13

Restating
Firms
11
6
4
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
28

Control Firms
7
4
1
2
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
18

Panel B: Number of DEBT Issuances per firm
Number of equity issuances by the same firm
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
11
14
15
18
29
Total
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Table 4, continued. DEBT issuance in restated period
Panel C: Principal amount of DEBT raised (in millions)
Sample
Total Amount Raised
Restating Firms
$21,162.70
Control Firms
$15,592.00

Mean

Q1

Median

Q3

N

$167.96
$216.56

$2.60
$100.00

$150.00
$200.00

$269.00
$250.00

126
72

Panel D: Principal amount of DEBT raised (as a percent of total assets)
Sample
Mean

Q1

Median

Q3

N

Restating Firms
Control Firms

0.05%
0.24%

1.91%
2.88%

0.38%
1.12%

1.70%
2.31%

126
72

Difference
Z-value
P>Z
-2.42
0.02**

Difference
Z-value
P>Z
-2.64
0.01***
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Table 5. Short-term market reaction to initial announcement of misstated earnings
This table shows the regression of abnormal return at the announcement of initial earnings containing
material mistakes on standardized unexpected earnings and equity and debt dummies and descriptive
statistics of all variables. The dependent variable Rt is market adjusted return for a 3 day window (-1; +1)
relative to the earnings announcement on day zero using value equally CRSP market index as a proxy for
the market return. Mistake is the amount by which earnings are misstated. Equity (Debt) is a dummy that
equals one for quarters in the restated period preceding equity (debt) issuance. In Panel E, Model 1
estimates equation (1), Model 2 estimates equation (2), Model 3 estimates equation (3), Model 4 estimates
equation (4). *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Rt = α + b1SUE t + ε t
(1)

Rt = α + b1SUE t + b2 MISTAKE t + ε t
Rt = α + b1SUE t + b2 MISTAKE t

(2)

+b3 Equity t + b4 Equity t * SUE t + b5 Equity t * MISTAKE t + ε t

Rt = α + b1SUE t + b2 MISTAKE t
+b3 Debt t + b4 Debt t * SUE t + b5 Debt t * MISTAKE t + ε t

,

,

(3)

(4)

Panel A: Full Sample
Mean
0.0012
-0.0042
0.0026

Q1
-0.0394
-0.0022
0.0000

Median
0.0045
0.0000
0.0000

Q3
0.0470
0.0011
0.0000

Std
0.0989
0.0231
0.0151

N
1843
1843
1843

Mean
-0.0102
-0.0129
0.0091

Q1
-0.0552
-0.0129
0.0008

Median
-0.0013
-0.0034
0.0032

Q3
0.0480
-0.0003
0.0102

Std
0.1160
0.0390
0.0273

N
518
518
518

Panel C: Non-zero mistake and equity=1
Mean
Q1
Rt
-0.0295
-0.0808
SUE
-0.0116
-0.0171
Mistake
0.0089
0.0005

Median
-0.0241
-0.0027
0.0027

Q3
0.0471
-0.0002
0.0154

Std
0.0971
0.0495
0.0392

N
79
79
79

Panel D: Non-zero mistake and debt=1
Mean
Rt
-0.0014
SUE
-0.0016
Mistake
0.0013

Median
-0.0002
-0.0017
0.0013

Q3
0.0351
0.0004
0.0027

Std
0.0541
0.0076
0.0075

N
40
40
40

Rt
SUE
Mistake
Panel B: Non-zero mistake
Rt
SUE
Mistake

Q1
-0.0332
-0.0034
-0.0001
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Table 5 (continued). Short-term market reaction to initial announcement of
misstated earnings
Panel E: Multivariate Analysis – Full Sample
X=Equity
Model 3

X=Debt
Model 4

Model 1

Model 2

0.003
1.17

0.002
0.97

0.004
1.35

0.003
1.05

0.432
2.53***

0.897
4.21***

0.850
3.93***

0.896
4.20***

0.981
3.83***

0.946
3.33***

0.985
3.84***

Intercept

alpha

SUE

b1

Mistake

b2

X

b3

-0.023
-2.62***

-0.007
-0.52

Sue*X

b4

1.365
1.92*

2.684
1.09

Mistake*X

b5

1.690
1.78*

1.196
0.48

1843
1.97%
9.56***

1843
2.25%
7.39***

1843
1.87%

-0.0839
-0.46

-0.0961
-0.39

-0.0892
-0.49

b1+b4
t value

2.215
3.29***

3.579
1.45

b2+b5
t value

2.636
2.91***

2.181
0.88

-0.421
-1.54

1.398
1.09

N
Adjusted R-square
F
b1-b2
t value

(b1+b4)-(b2+b5)
t value

1843
0.96%
6.39***
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Table 5 (continued). Short-term market reaction to initial announcement of
misstated earnings
Panel F: Multivariate Analysis - Downward restatements
X=Equity
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

X=Debt
Model 4

Intercept

alpha

0.001
0.55

0.001
0.37

0.002
0.76

0.001
0.44

SUE

b1

0.415
2.43**

0.875
4.06***

0.828
3.78***

0.874
4.05***

Mistake

b2

0.964
3.72***

0.930
3.21***

0.969
3.72***

X

b3

-0.022
-2.44**

-0.005
-0.40

Sue*X

b4

1.388
1.95**

2.706
1.09

Mistake*X

b5

1.707
1.80*

1.212
0.49

1,660
2.07%
8.90***

1,660
2.36%
6.91***

1,660
1.96%
4.26***

-0.0896
-0.49

-0.1021
-0.41

-0.0950
-0.52

b1+b4
t value

2.215
3.29***

3.579
1.45

b2+b5
t value

2.636
2.91***

2.181
0.88

-0.421
-1.54

1.398
1.09

N
Adjusted R-square
F
b1-b2
t value

(b1+b4)-(b2+b5)
t value

1,660
1.00%
5.88***
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Table 6. Abnormal Returns before Equity and Debt Issuance
This table shows abnormal returns for a sample of firms that restated financial statements during the period January 1,
1997 to June 30, 2002. Market model CAR is market cumulative abnormal return, for which abnormal return is calculated
as the difference between firm’s return and market model predicted return. Market adjusted CAR is cumulative abnormal
return, for which abnormal return is calculated as the difference between firm’s return and market return. BHAR is the buyand-hold abnormal return calculated as the difference between firm’s return and a return on a control firm. Control firms
are found among all firms that did not restate their earnings during the period January 1, 1995 to June 30, 2002 in the same
two digit SIC code as restating firms that are the closest in size (market value) and book-to-market, measured one fiscal
year prior to the announcement of restatement, and have sufficient data to calculate returns one year prior to mistake and
one year subsequent to restatement. ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) is the difference between restated net income and originally
reported net income, standardized by the absolute value of the originally reported net income. ΔNI /Assets is the
difference between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by book value of total assets
measured on year prior to restatement announcement. *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Restated period abnormal returns before EQUITY issuance (Mistake, Issuance)
Daily Abnormal
Return
Market model CAR
Market model CAR
Market adjusted CAR
BHAR
BHAR

Market model parameters estimation period
(-254, -5) relative to mistake
(-501, -250) relative to mistake

Median
0.07%
0.09%
0.19%
0.14%
0.11%

St Dev
1.64%
0.78%
0.68%
1.02%
1.03%

N
42
32
42
42
42

T-value
-0.48
1.49
3.27 ***
2.84 ***
1.91 **

Panel B: Restated period abnormal returns before DEBT issuance (Mistake, Issuance)
Daily abnormal
Return
Market model parameters estimation period
Mean
Median
Market model CAR
(-254, -5) relative to mistake
-0.44% -0.07%
Market model CAR
(-501, -250) relative to mistake
-0.27% -0.07%
Market adjusted CAR
-0.01% -0.03%
BHAR
Relative to control firm
-0.08% -0.08%
BHAR
Relative to pre-mistake performance
0.03%
-0.01%

St Dev
1.89%
0.97%
0.21%
0.55%
0.53%

N
27
27
27
27
27

T-value
-1.21
-1.41
-0.28
-0.73
0.30

Panel C: EQUITY issuing firms abnormal returns one year prior to mistake (1 year, Mistake)
Daily Abnormal
Return
Market model parameters estimation period
Mean
Median St Dev
Market model CAR
(-501, -250) relative to mistake
0.09%
0.02%
0.65%
Market adjusted CAR
0.13%
0.08%
0.39%
BHAR
Relative to control firm
-0.02%
0.07%
0.74%

N
32
42
42

T-value
0.82
2.19 **
-0.21

Panel D: DEBT issuing firms abnormal returns one year prior to mistake (1 year, Mistake)
Daily Abnormal
Return
Market model parameters estimation period
Mean
Median St Dev
Market model CAR
(-501, -250) relative to mistake
-0.22% -0.06% 1.03%
Market adjusted CAR
-0.01% -0.01% 0.29%
BHAR
Relative to control firm
-0.02%
0.04%
0.41%

N
26
27
27

T-value
1.06
-1.20
-0.18

Relative to control firm
Relative to pre-mistake performance

Mean
-0.12%
0.21%
0.34%
0.45%
0.31%

43

Table 7. Descriptive statistics for restating firms conditional on security issuance
This table shows descriptive statistics for a sample of firms that restated financial statements during the period
January 1, 1997 to June 30, 2002. Firm characteristics are calculated one year prior to the year of restatement
announcement. Market value is calculated as the product of the closing price at the end of the fiscal year and
the number of common shares outstanding. Book value is the book value of total common equity. Leverage is
calculated as the value of the long term debt deflated by end of year assets. Book-to-market is the ratio of book
value of total common equity to the market value. Buy-and-hold return before mistake is the daily buy-andhold return estimated one year before the start of the restated period. ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI) is the difference
between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by the absolute value of the
originally reported net income. ΔNI/Assets is the difference between restated net income and originally reported
net income, standardized by book value of total assets measured on year prior to restatement announcement.
Number of periods restated is in years. Comparison of sub-samples is performed using Wilcoxon signed ranks
test (2-tailed). *, **, *** indicates significance at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Panel A: Characteristics of restating firms that do not issue equity or debt (NO ISSUANCE)
Mean
Q1
Median
Q3
Market value (in millions)
2,082.72
37.54
128.45
535.35
Book value (in millions)
1,950.36
46.45
206.61
778.58
Leverage
18.24%
1.13%
11.97%
28.69%
Book-to-market
0.66
0.19
0.45
0.87
Buy-and-hold return before mistake
0.09%
-0.13%
0.00%
0.20%
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI)
-282.73%
-77.81%
-29.73%
-6.13%
ΔNI/Assets
-47.05%
-4.76%
-1.19%
-0.21%
Number of periods restated
1.20
0.50
1.00
1.75

N
360
360
358
360
349
344
350
360

Panel B: Characteristics of restating firms that issue EQUITY
Mean
Q1
Market value (in millions)
2,238.63
118.23
Book value (in millions)
2,446.86
81.54
Leverage
17.15%
0.43%
Book-to-market
0.52
0.18
Buy-and-hold return before mistake
0.25%
-0.06%
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI)
-100.84%
-72.00%
ΔNI/Assets
-4.28%
-5.16%
Number of periods restated
1.97
1.00

N
68
68
68
68
42
68
68
68

Median
330.64
248.35
9.57%
0.32
0.12%
-13.55%
-0.96%
1.75

Q3
1,089.74
1,203.22
29.69%
0.65
0.49%
-1.06%
-0.08%
2.75

Panel C: Comparison of characteristics of restating firms that issue equity and restating firms that do
not issue equity or debt (EQUITY vs NO ISSUANCE)
Mean
Z-value
P>Z (two sided)
Market value (in millions)
155.91
3.38
<0.01 ***
Book value (in millions)
496.50
1.56
0.12
Leverage
-1.09%
-0.58
0.56
Book-to-market
-0.14
-1.37
0.17
Buy-and-hold return before mistake
0.16%
2.63
<0.01 ***
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI)
1.82
1.94
0.05 **
ΔNI/Assets
0.43
0.54
0.59
Number of periods restated
0.77
5.53
<0.01 ***
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Table 7, continued: Descriptive statistics for restating firms conditional on security issuance
Panel D: Characteristics of restating firms that issue DEBT

Market value (in millions)
Book value (in millions)
Leverage
Book-to-market
Buy-and-hold return before mistake
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI)
ΔNI/Assets
Number of periods restated

Mean
7,826.09
11,400.22
28.92%
0.49
0.08%
-9.96%
-0.38%
2.19

Q1
961.76
2,241.21
16.95%
0.23
-0.06%
-16.12%
-0.40%
1.13

Median
3,143.94
5,538.57
27.52%
0.40
0.07%
-4.59%
-0.18%
2.00

Q3
10,023.23
14,084.30
38.59%
0.62
0.15%
-0.93%
-0.05%
3.00

N
28
28
28
28
27
28
28
28

Panel E: Comparison of characteristics of restating firms that issue debt and restating firms that do not issue
equity or debt (DEBT vs NO ISSUANCE)
Mean
Z-value
P>Z (two sided)
Market value (in millions)
5,743.37
6.10
<0.01 ***
Book value (in millions)
9,449.86
7.30
<0.01 ***
Leverage
10.68%
3.67
<0.01 ***
Book-to-market
-0.17
-0.50
0.62
Buy-and-hold return before mistake
-0.01%
1.11
0.27
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI)
272.77%
3.95
<0.01 ***
ΔNI/Assets
46.67%
3.98
<0.01 ***
Number of periods restated
0.99
4.47
<0.01 ***
Panel F: Comparison of characteristics of restating firms that issue debt and restating firms that issue equity
(DEBT vs EQUITY)
Mean
Z-value
P>Z (two sided)
Market value (in millions)
5,197.51
4.38
<0.01 ***
Book value (in millions)
9,948.21
5.92
<0.01 ***
Leverage
12.83%
3.15
<0.01 ***
Book-to-market
0.04
0.96
0.34
Buy-and-hold return before mistake
-0.17%
-1.23
0.22
ΔNI/abs(OriginalNI)
103.89%
1.67
0.10 *
ΔNI/Assets
3.90%
2.58
<0.01 ***
Number of periods restated
-0.05
0.00
1.00
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Table 8. Likelihood of equity and debt issuance
This table shows logit model of the likelihood of equity and debt issuance by restating firms. The analysis
is performed for downward restatements only. Downward (upward) restatements are defined as
restatements revising net income downward (upward) at restatement announcement. The dependent
variable in Model 1 (Model 2), Equity (Debt), is equal to 1 if the firm issued equity (debt) and zero
otherwise. Buy-and-hold return before mistake is the daily buy-and-hold return estimated one year before
the start of the restated period. Leverage is calculated one year prior to the year of restatement
announcement as the value of the long term debt deflated by end of year assets. ΔNI/Assets is the difference
between restated net income and originally reported net income, standardized by book value of total assets
measured on year prior to restatement announcement. Number of periods restated is in years. Market value
is calculated as the product of the closing price at the end of the fiscal year one year prior to the year of
restatement announcement and the number of common shares outstanding. *, **, *** indicates significance
at 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.

Intercept
Buy-and-hold return before mistake
Leverage
ΔNI/Assets
Number of periods restated
log(Market value)
Likelihood ratio
Number of observations

Model 1 – Equity issuance
Estimate
Chi-Square
-3.378
29.23
***
99.690
6.20
***
-1.190
1.08
6.144
2.40
0.518
9.61
***
0.108
1.38
20.44
342

***

Model 2 – Debt issuance
Estimate
Chi-Square
-7.567
30.70
***
-59.152
0.24
2.327
2.81
*
102.900
5.28
**
0.687
8.20
***
0.632
16.66
***
65.05
342

***
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